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RETHINKING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: A REVIEW
OF REMEDIAL APPROACHES TO ADDRESS THE




In December of 1987, the United States Department of State de-
ported Floyd Karamba, a commercial attach6 at the Zimbabwean mis-
sion to the United Nations, on charges that he severely abused his chil-
dren while forcing his family to watch.1 The United States did not
charge Karamba with any crime because he possessed diplomatic im-
munity.' Karamba's victimized son Terrence remained in the United
States temporarily until a State Department psychiatrist determined
that the boy, who was badly injured and severely traumatized as a re-
sult of the beatings, was psychologically prepared for the journey to
Zimbabwe.3 In recognition of Karamba's diplomatic immunity, the
United States Supreme Court lifted the stay preventing the boy's
return.4
Diplomatic immunity, traditionally a fundamental principle of cus-
tomary international law,5 originated to protect representatives of for-
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Uhlig, Court Won't Bar Return of Boy in Abuse Case to Zimbabwe, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 1, 1988, at 33. The New York City Human Resources Administration and
Legal Aid Society submitted court papers alleging that Floyd Karamba,
on several occasions, removed all of Terrence's clothing ... tied his arms behind
his back with wire or rope, tied his legs together, and hung him by his bound
arms from a pipe in the basement of the case address. After doing so, the respon-
dent has then beaten Terrence with an extension cord.
Id.
The petition also asserted that at least once, Mr. Karamba "untied his son while he
was suspended from the ceiling, sending him to the floor face first and injuring his nose
and lips." Id. A Legal Aid attorney who has worked on Terrence Karamba's case said
that he was beaten so badly that "[h]is back almost looks like a venetian blind." Id.
2. Id.; see In re Terrence K., 138 Misc. 2d 611, 613, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (Fam.
Ct. 1988) (recognizing that the Office of Protocol of the State Department conferred
diplomatic immunity on Floyd Karamba).
3. Kamen, Supreme Court Lifts Stay; U.S. to Return Boy to Zimbabwe, Wash.
Post, Jan. 16, 1988, at All.
4. Id.
5. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979
I.C.J. 7, 19 (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Dec. 19) (stating
that diplomatic immunity is a basic prerequisite for relations among states); B. SEN, A
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eign governments based abroad from retaliation in time of international
conflicts and to promote civilized international relations." Today, how-
ever, diplomats, their families, personal servants, and staff abuse this
privilege to escape prosecution for a variety of offenses ranging from
minor traffic violations to the most heinous criminal acts, such as the
child abuse example cited above. Diplomatic immunity also permits
diplomats to escape civil liability in personal injury actions.
To 'the casual observer, diplomatic immunity merely excuses diplo-
mats from paying parking tickets. Although this presents a major prob-
lem for cities such as Washington D.C., New York,8 and London'
which house large contingents of diplomatic missions, the victims of
diplomatic crime testify that the problem is far worse. Diplomats, their
families, personal servants, and staff escape prosecution for crimes
ranging from driving under the influence of alcohol,10 to shoplifting,1
DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3-7 (1965) (review-
ing history of diplomatic immunity); M. OGDON, BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 10-
30 (1936) (discussing the history of the development of diplomatic immunity among
the ancients).
6. See M. OGDON, supra note 5, at 9-10 (noting society's early realization that
granting immunity to foreign embassies provided reciprocal advantages).
7. The Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention On Diplo-
matic Relations]. See infra notes 47-63, 100-108 and accompanying text (discussing
the provisions of the Convention). The Convention codified the principle of diplomatic
immunity as a matter of international law. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, §§
2-6, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) incorporated the Vienna Con-
vention On Diplomatic Relations into United States law. See infra notes 65-73 (analyz-
ing the Act and distinguishing it from the Vienna Convention).
See generally C. ASHMAN & P. TRESCOTT, DIPLOMATIC CRIME (1987) [hereinafter
DIPLOMATIC CRIME] (providing an account of the use of diplomatic privileges and im-
munities to excuse violent crimes and torts committed by diplomats, their families, ser-
vants, and staff).
8. Congress Takes Aim at Diplomatic Immunity, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Sept. 4, 1978, at 34. In 1976, diplomats in Washington, D.C. answered only twenty
percent of parking tickets incurred, leaving $889,870 in parking fines unpaid. Id. Diplo-
mats in New York City accumulate $5 million in unpaid parking tickets each year. Id.
The attitude of the diplomat towards parking is accurately characterized by the com-
ment of an Ecuadorean diplomat in 1926. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 325. In
responding to a police officer when he was told that he was parked illegally, he said, "If
I choose to leave my car in the middle of Sixteenth Street, it would be none of your
damn business." Id.
9. United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1984, 55 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
405, 479-80 (1986) [hereinafter United Kingdom Materials]. In the United Kingdom
from 1974 to 1983, there were 706,517 parking tickets accumulated by immune diplo-
mats that went unpaid. Id.
10. Lynton, Envoy's Car Slams Into 4 Vehicles, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, at BI.
The ambassador from Papua New Guinea, Kiatro Abisinito, driving while he was obvi-
ously drunk, crashed into four cars, seriously injuring one person sitting in one of the
cars. Id. Papua New Guinea recalled its ambassador as he was facing the possibility of
unprecedented criminal charges. Oberdorfer, Papua New Guinea Recalls Diplomat,
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assault,12 drug trafficking,1 kidnapping) 4 rape,15 the imposition of
slavery, 6 and even murder.1"
Vash. Post, Feb. 21, 1987, at B1. Papua New Guinea recently settled the case with the
victim. Wheeler, Broken Spear a Symbol of Peace, Wash. Post, July 30, 1988, at BI.
See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing the State Department's in-
terpretation of the ambassador's diplomatic immunity).
11. Weiser & Knight, Crime by Those with Diplomatic Immunity Rises, Wash.
Post, Jan. 9, 1984, at Al. Soviet Embassy personnel in Washington were implicated a
number of times in shoplifting incidents. Id. at A16. In another case, Iran's ambassa-
dor to the United Nations was caught trying to steal a SI00 raincoat from a depart-
ment store in New York City in 1986. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 85-86; see
id. at 274-86 (recounting additional examples of diplomatic shoplifting).
12. Weiser & Knight, supra note 11, at A16. The grandson of the Brazilian Am-
bassador to the United States shot Kenneth Skeen three times in an altercation at a
Washington nightclub. Id. A civil suit brought against Brazil was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F.
Supp. 1414, 1420 (D.D.C. 1983).
13. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 165-89. A number of incidents involving
attempts at bringing illegal drugs into the United States via the diplomatic pouch are
detailed. Id.; see also United States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, 840-41 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that a Thai consular official convicted in a conspiracy to import and
distribute heroin was not entitled to diplomatic immunity).
14. Nigerian Kidnapping, THE ECONOMIST, July 14, 1984, at 55-56. A highly pub-
licized incident in Great Britain implicated Nigerian diplomats in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to kidnap an exiled Nigerian former minister and ship him back to Nigeria in a
diplomatic crate. Id.
15. McFadden, Repatriation Asked for Diplomatic's Son, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1981, at 33 [hereinafter McFadden: Repatriation]. Manuel Ayree, the 19 year old son
of a low-level Ghanian diplomat to the United Nations in New York was positively
identified as the perpetrator of at least two and possibly as many as fifteen rapes and
robberies on the Upper East Side of Manhattan. Id. Mr. Ayree "voluntary repatriated"
to Ghana and never faced charges for the crimes. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at
50. An unenforced judgment by a federal court in New York approved S1,786,462 in
civil damages for two of the rape victims in a suit against Mr. Ayree. Damages Ap-
proved for Rape Victim of Diplomatic's Son, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1982, at 1.
16. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 106-13. A Saudi prince living in Miami
allegedly kept domestic servants in his home against their will. Id. A number of inci-
dents have come to light where diplomats held foreign nationals brought to the United
States as domestic slaves. Id. Having no money, no contact with the outside world, and
speaking no English, these "domestic slaves" were helpless. Id. at 248-73; see also
Walsh, Ex-Maid of Somali Diplomat Given Political Asylum Here, Wash. Post, Nov.
28, 1988, at E8 (noting that a Somali woman working as a maid had not received
wages or a day off in two years from her employer, a consular secretary working from
Somalia).
17. See Comment, State Sponsored Terrorism Libya's Abuse of Diplomatic Privi-
leges and Immunities, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 134, 134-36 (1986) [hereinafter State Spon-
sored Terrorism] (discussing the implications of diplomatic immunity in a case where
a London policewoman was shot and killed; the gunfire came from inside the Libyan
"People's Bureau," which was the former Libyan embassy in Great Britain); see also
United Kingdom Materials, supra note 9, at 483-85 (evaluating the actions of the Brit-
ish Government in asserting that diplomatic immunity protected the Libyans inside the
"People's Bureau" and their personal belongings); Goldberg, The Shootout at the Lib-
yan Self-Styled People's Bureau: A Case of State-Supported International Terrorism,
30 S.D.L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1984) (questioning whether the Libyan "diplomats" had not
lost their diplomatic status when the crime of murder was committed).
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Part I of this Comment traces the history of diplomatic immunity,
identifying the original purpose of the privilege and discussing its codi-
fication into international law through the Vienna Convention On Dip-
lomatic Relations and subsequent incorporation into United States law.
Part II demonstrates how diplomatic immunity functions in the United
States, and describes the difficulty that local law enforcement officials
encounter in dealing with diplomatic crime. Part III evaluates remedies
that the United States can exercise to reprimand diplomats immune
from prosecution. Part IV examines various proposals for reform, em-
phasizing the pending diplomatic crimes legislation in the United
States Congress. Part V discusses new proposals and the policy implica-
tions of limiting diplomatic immunity, and recommends that the inter-
national community seriously rethink this policy. The analysis suggests
that proper legislation can maintain the fundamental principle of diplo-
matic immunity while holding the personal servants and domestic staff
of diplomats to account for crimes or civil wrongs in a manner consis-
tent with current international law.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION OF
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Ancient civilized states developed the concept and engaged in the
practice of diplomatic immunity.' Histories of the ancient Greeks, Ro-
mans, Jews, Chinese, Indians, and Europeans provide clear evidence
that these states practiced diplomatic immunity.' 9 Recognizing that the
The principle of diplomatic immunity is greatly misunderstood. Shenon, A Corner-
stone Can Be Burdensome, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1987, at A16. For example, a delegate
to the United Nations from Barbados believed that diplomatic immunity extended to
his German Shepherd when it bit several neighbors in Pelham, New York. Id. The
diplomat warned of "possible international consequences" if any action was taken
against the dog. Id.
Senator Robert Byrd sums up the practical implication of diplomatic immunity, as it
is interpreted today in international relations:
[It] seems inconceivable to me that a relative of a diplomat can carry a gun in
this country and shoot an American and cannot be arrested ... If this can hap-
pen, they can come in, they can burn down our houses if they want to, they can
shoot us in the streets, they can mug us, they can rob us, they can rape, they can
murder and they cannot be arrested.
Minzesheimer, Exceptions to the Rules, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1983, at 11 (Magazine
Section).
18. E. SATOW, SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 106 (Lord Gore-Booth
5th ed. 1979). Hugo Grotius wrote that there were two inherent rights of ambassadors
abroad: the right of admission into the host country, and the right of freedom from
violence. 2 H. GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcis LIBRI TRES (book 1) 440 (F. Kelsey
trans. 1925); see also Wesson, 300 Years of Diplomatic Immunity, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Jan. 3, 1980, at 23 (tracing the history of the privilege).
19. M. OGDON, supra note 5, at 10-30; E. SATOW, supra note 18, at 120. The
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practice of protecting foreign representatives reciprocally benefits both
parties, these states provided immunity for each other's ambassadors
regardless of the gravity of the foreign envoy's acts. -0
A. THEORETICAL BASES FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Three theories seek to justify diplomatic immunity. As illustrated,
the theoretical justification for diplomatic immunity does not survive
careful scrutiny. The three theories are personal representation, the
theory of extraterritoriality, and the theory of functional necessity.
The theory of personal representation was the first justification prop-
agated to justify diplomatic immunity.2 1 Under the theory of personal
representation, diplomats acting on behalf of a sovereign state embody
the ruler of that state.2 An affront to the representative of a sovereign
state under this theory constitutes an affront to the foreign state
itself.
2 '
Analysis discredits this theory on three grounds. First, the foreign
envoy cannot have the same degree of immunity as the sending state,
because this principle places the individual diplomat above the law of
the host state. 4 Second, the decline of the powerful monarch and the
inviolability of the ambassador was so entrenched in international practice that since
the sixteenth century no instances where a receiving government authorized a breach of
a diplomat's inviolability are documented. E. SATON, supra note 18, at 120.
But see Rafat, The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: As-
pects of the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehe-
ran, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 425, 426-28 (1981) (discussing the imprisonment of
52 American diplomats as hostages in Iran in November of 1979). The government of
Iran explicitly endorsed the forced imprisonment of accredited United States diplo-
mats, a blatant violation of the principle of diplomatic immunity as codified in the
Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 29, to which Iran is a
party. Id.
20. Wesson, supra note 18, at 23. In 1562, the French government allowed the
British Ambassador to leave freely even after associating with the king's enemies. Id.
In 1584, the Spanish Ambassador to Great Britain was involved in a plot to kill Queen
Elizabeth but was not punished, only expelled. Id. Governments have generally re-
spected diplomatic immunity, with few exceptions, even through two world wars. Id.
Allied forces honored the rights of representatives from Nazi Germany and Japan. Id.
United States representatives abroad during World War I1 were also immune. Id.
21. See C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND lINIONI'Trs 1-5 (1967) (discuss-
ing in detail the theory of personal representation); B. SEN, supra note 5, at 80-83
(reviewing the different theoretical bases of diplomatic immunities).
22. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4. A review of the contemporary practice of diplomatic immunity shows
that although, theoretically, diplomats are not above the law, Vienna Convention On
Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 41, para. 1, diplomatic immunity does indeed
place diplomats above the law. 133 CONG. REc. S13,797 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987)
(statement of Sen. Helms). The mere fact that 58,000 people in the United States,
comprised of diplomats, their families, servants, and staff can routinely break the law
1989]
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evolution of popular rule makes it unclear exactly whom the diplomat
represents.25 Third, the theory extends no basis for protecting diplomats
from the consequences of their private actions.26
The second theoretical justification advanced to justify diplomatic
immunity is the theory of extraterritoriality. 27 Under this rationaliza-
tion, the diplomat legally resides on the soil of the sending state despite
the fact that the diplomat lives abroad.2 8 Consequently, the foreign en-
voy is not subject to the law of the receiving state due to a lack of a
local residence.29 Although this legal fiction received widespread sup-
port from international legal scholars and in judicial opinions, authori-
ties have recently questioned and subsequently rejected the theory as a
basis for a broad construction of diplomatic immunity.30 Problems stem
from the vagueness of the term "extraterritoriality." Extraterritoriality
is subject to a number of incoherent interpretations, 31 each providing
illogical implications. 2 For example, if diplomatic premises covered an
entire section of a city, that part of the city would become untouchable
by local law enforcement because it is not theoretically part of the ter-
ritory of the receiving state.3
The third theory, the most widely accepted current justification of
diplomatic immunity, is the theory of functional necessity.3 4 This the-
ory provides that the diplomat is not subject to the jurisdiction of local
courts, because this would hamper the functions of diplomatic rela-
and evade prosecution for serious crimes demonstrates this fact. Id.
25. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Id. As discussed below, the provisions of the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic
Relations, supra note 7, conflict as to whether a diplomat can be held liable for private
acts. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (comparing the grant of immunity
under articles 29-40 and the duty imposed on the diplomat to respect the laws and
regulations of the receiving state under article 41 of the Convention).
27. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 5-16.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. Comment, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna Con-
vention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 177, 203-04 (1987) [herein-
after Amending the Vienna Convention]. The author concludes, after a review of the
legislative history of the Vienna Convention, that the drafters intended to narrow, not
broaden, the scope of diplomatic immunity. Id. at 207-10.
31. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 12; see M. OGDON, supra note 5, at 77-84 (dis-
cussing the various interpretations of the term "extraterritoriality").
32. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 14-15.
33. Id. at 15. The author notes that under this interpretation, based on the
franchise du quartier, the part of the city that was subject to immunity, because it is
off limits to law enforcement, would become a haven for criminals. Id. This interpreta-
tion was accepted in Europe until 1686, when the Pope, reacting to continued abuses of
the diplomatic privilege, convinced European states to reject this practice. Id.
34. Id. at 17.
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tions.3 5 The functional necessity theory justifies immunity for the pur-
pose of allowing diplomats to conduct their business. Accordingly, dip-
lomatic immunity protects the diplomat's ability to carry out that work
efficiently. 36 The privilege does not, however, afford protection and ben-
efits to the diplomat as a person.37
If a diplomat acts outside of the normal sphere of conducting inter-
national relations, a question arises as to whether immunity still ap-
plies.38 Current administrative and judicial construction of diplomatic
immunity illustrate that diplomats themselves are immune from prose-
cution even when committing criminal or tortious acts outside of their
prescribed functions. 39 A critique of this construction of the functional
necessity theory distinguishes the treatment of the individual diplomat
from that of the diplomatic process.40
In theory, diplomatic immunity originated to protect the process of
furthering relations between nation states.4" The current focus of im-
munity on the individual diplomat is therefore unsound. The assertion
that the diplomat cannot function efficiently without immunity implies
that the diplomat must break the law of the receiving state in order to
conduct international relations. 2 Therefore, the current construction,
providing diplomatic immunity to the individual, is inconsistent with
the theoretical basis that accords protection only to the diplomatic
35. Id.
36. Diplomatic Crimes Legislation.: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on Diplo-
matic Crimes Legislation] (statement of Pamela Trescott, Esq.).
37. See Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, preamble (stat-
ing that the purpose of diplomatic immunity is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
that diplomatic representatives are able to perform their functions efficiently). This
provision of the preamble to the Convention reflects the movement against the interna-
tional treatment of the diplomat as a privileged class. M. OGDON, supra note 5, at 220.
38. Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L. REv.
1517, 1521-22 (1986) [hereinafter Insuring Against Abuse]. The author uses the func-
tional necessity theory as a basis for proposing the establishment of a mandatory insur-
ance scheme for satisfying judgments against insurers of diplomats because that re-
striction would not affect the diplomatic function. Id. at 1522.
See infra note 139 for an example of a case where a diplomat was held responsible
for a criminal act because it was committed outside the scope of his functional
authority.
39. Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 667 (1980) [hereinafter A New Regime]; see infra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text (providing a critique of the functional necessity
theory of diplomatic immunity).
40. A New Regime, supra note 39, at 667-72.
41. Id.
42. Id. The author notes that international relations will continue even if the diplo-
mat fails to obey local laws. Id. at 670.
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B. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The formulation of the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations
(Vienna Convention) was largely a reaction to the unlimited immunity
historically granted to diplomats." In United States law, section 25 of
the Act of April 30, 1790 extended blanket immunity not only to am-
bassadors and their administrative staff, but also to the ambassador's
personal servants. 45 This statute was so protective of diplomats that one
provision made it a crime merely to bring suit against any person pos-
sessing diplomatic immunity. Sanctions for bringing suit under this
provision included a fine and imprisonment for up to three years."
The establishment of an international convention on diplomatic im-
munity sought to standardize the practice of receiving diplomatic offi-
cials and establishing diplomatic missions, and to codify the customary
international law of diplomatic immunity.47 The preamble to the Vi-
43. Id. A more accurate interpretation of the functional necessity theory is one that
protects the diplomatic process. Id. This imposes liability on diplomats for acts commit-
ted outside their official capacity because this burden would not interfere with diplo-
matic relations between the countries. Id.; see Amending the Vienna Convention, supra
note 30, at 203-04 (noting that the functional necessity theory is misinterpreted and
misapplied under the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations); Recent Develop-
ment, Diplomatic Immunity: Application of the Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic Im-
munity, 29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 533, 537-40 (1988) [hereinafter Application of the Restric-
tive Theory] (discussing precedent for the restrictive theory of diplomatic immunity in
customary international law).
44. M. OGDON, supra note 5, at vii (citing a shift of world public opinion against
diplomatic privileges).
45. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch.9, I Stat. 112, 117, repealed by The Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act of 1978, §§ 1-6, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982).
46. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, § 4065, 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1982). See
Turan, The Devilish Demands of Diplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1976, at
I 1 (Potomac Section) (describing the consequences of arresting a diplomat under the
1790 act). In 1935, two policemen in Elkton, Maryland were dismissed from their po-
lice force, tried for assault and fined when they arrested the Iranian Ambassador and
his chauffeur for speeding and resisting arrest. Id.
See also Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that a
butler and chauffeur employed by the Czechoslovak Ambassador were immune from
jurisdiction in a suit for separate maintenance, child custody and child support). This
case illustrates the broad construction of diplomatic immunity under the 1790 statute.
Id.
47. See Comment, The Diplomatic Relations Act: The United States Protects Its
Own, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 379, 385-87 (1979) (discussing the background and
provisions of the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations).
The goal of the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immuni-
ties was to establish a comprehensive compilation of the rights and privileges of mem-
bers of diplomatic missions in light of developments in diplomatic law and practice
since the standards set by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Conference of Aix-la
Chapelle in 1818. United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immuni-
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enna Convention reflected the international concern of giving unlimited
immunity to all classes of diplomats. The stated purpose of the Conven-
tion is to enable diplomatic missions to represent their sending state.48
The drafters did not design it for the individual's benefit. 0
The Vienna Convention establishes four categories of diplomatic per-
sonnel, with different levels of immunity allotted to each. The diplo-
matic agent is the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic
staff of the mission. "° Diplomatic agents are not subject to arrest or
detainment.51 They are completely immune from the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state,52 as well as from civil jurisdiction for acts
committed within their official capacity.5 3 They are, however, subject to
local jurisdiction for certain private acts.5' The family of the diplomatic
agent enjoys the same immunity status as the agent. 5
The administrative and technical personnel"6 employed by the mis-
sion possess the same immunity as the diplomatic agents with respect
to criminal jurisdiction.57 The Vienna Convention limits the immunity
of administrative and technical personnel with respect to civil jurisdic-
ties: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-3 (1963) [hereinafter United Nations Conference].
Also in 1963, similar steps were taken to define the privileges and immunities of
Consular officials. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7. These
steps resulted in the Vienna Convention On Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Because the Consul largely functions
in the protection of nationals and interests of nationals in the receiving state, an analy-
sis of Consular immunity is outside the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of
consular immunity issues, see generally Comment, Consular Immunity From Service
of Process Under The Vienna Convention On Consular Relations, 8 FORDHAb INT'L
L.J. 96 (1984).
48. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, preamble.
49. Amending the Vienna Convention, supra note 30, at 204.
50. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 1, para. e.
51. Id. art. 29.
52. Id. art. 31. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 461 comment d and reporters note 7 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983)
(approving the detention of a diplomatic agent for the agent's own safety or for the
safety of others).
53. See Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 31, para.
1(a)-(c) (delineating that the diplomatic agent is subject to civil jurisdiction in cases
relating to: (I) real property situated in the receiving state; (2) actions where the diplo-
matic agent is involved privately as administrator, executor, heir, or legatee; and, (3)
actions relating to professional or commercial activity outside the official functions of
the diplomatic agent).
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 37, para. 1. Cf. Privileges and Immunities of the Diplomatic Family,
25 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 329, 330-32 (1976) (examining how different countries inter-
pret article 37, and discussing various reservations entered to this provision of the Vi-
enna Convention On Diplomatic Relations).
56. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 1, para. f.
57. Id. art. 37, para. 2.
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tion, however, to acts performed within the course of their duties.,8
The service staff, who performs domestic services for the mission, 9 is
only immune for acts performed in the course of their domestic du-
ties.6" The final category is the private servant, who provides domestic
service for a member of the mission and who is not an employee of the
sending state.61 Private servants have only the immunity that the re-
ceiving state concedes, with the caveat that the receiving state must
exercise its jurisdiction over private servants in a manner that does not
interfere with the performance of the functions of the mission.6 2
In addition to the immunities provided for in the Vienna Convention,
article 41 imposes a duty, although it is without prejudice to the diplo-
matic immunity conferred in article 31, on the persons who benefit
from such privileges and immunities to obey the laws and regulations
of the receiving state.63 This paradoxical provision is superfluous, be-
cause a diplomat who does not respect the laws and regulations of the
receiving state is immune from any legal recourse due to a lack of any
enforcement provision in the Vienna Convention.64 Therefore, a provi-
sion requiring those with immunity to obey the laws of the receiving
state without an enforcement mechanism is meaningless.
C. THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT OF 1978
Under United States law, the broad definitions of diplomatic immu-
58. Id.
59. Id. art. 1, para. g.
60. Id. art. 37, para. 3.
61. Id. art. 1, para. h.
62. Id. art. 37, para. 4. But cf. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Ambassadors and Consuls § 10
(1962) (stating that the domestic servant or employee of the diplomat may not plead
diplomatic immunity; the sending state must assert immunity for that employee).
The ambassador's family and nondiplomatic staff commit most of the offenses that
immunity excuses. 133 CONG. REC. S13,801 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (testimony of
Chuck Ashman, author of DIPLOMATIC CRIME). "It is not the Ambassador who rapes.
It is more likely his son. It is not Ambassador [sic] who kills. It is more likely his
chauffeur." Id.
63. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 41, para. i.
64. See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1522 (discussing that the nature
of the conflict between article 41, paragraph 1 of the Convention and the provisions
granting immunity is irreconcilable). When the diplomat violates the laws of the receiv-
ing state, article 31 renders the diplomat totally immune from jurisdiction. Id. Al-
though article 41 imposes a duty on the diplomatic official, this duty is without
prejudice to diplomatic immunity. Id. With the two conflicting provisions, the Conven-
tion contains no legal remedies to compel diplomats to respect the laws of the receiving
state. Id. The Convention only provides limited options to address the abuses of an
individual diplomat. Note, State Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 17, at 133-34. See
infra notes 100-28 and accompanying text (discussing the limited remedial measures,
short of terminating diplomatic relations, that are available against undesirable diplo-
mats under the Vienna Convention).
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nity were codified in the Act of 1790. These definitions conflict with the
more limited classifications of immunity in the Vienna Convention."
Public expression of hostility toward diplomats and frustration gener-
ated from a lack of accountability for criminal acts,66 as well from an
absence of civil remedies for injuries inflicted by diplomats,67 prompted
Congress to pass the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.8
The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 repealed the 1790 Act and
brought United States diplomatic immunity law into conformity with
the Vienna Convention. 9 In addition, the Act added two provisions in
an attempt to provide victims of torts committed by diplomats with
adequate compensation."° First, the Act requires members of diplo-
matic missions to purchase liability insurance.71 Second, the Act pro-
vides a direct right of action for injured parties against the insurer of
an immune diplomat.7 2 These attempted reforms, however, lack ade-
quate enforcement mechanisms, and therefore unequivocally fail to
compensate the innocent victim.7 3
Three major inadequacies in the implementation of the Diplomatic
65. Comment, The Diplomatic Relations Act, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1019, 1020
(1978).
66. See Comment, The Effect of the Diplomatic Relations Act, 11 CAL W. IT r'L
L.J. 354, 357 (1981) [hereinafter The Effect of the Diplomatic Relations Act] (noting
that the hostility expressed by the American public manifested itself in a large crime
wave against foreign diplomats in the United States); see also Hearings on Diplomatic
Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 65-100 (discussing that while Congress consid-
ered legislation to address the issue of diplomatic crime, the testimony of a victims'
panel during recent hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reflected
similar public sentiment against what is seen as an unlimited and unjustified privilege).
67. See id. at 354, 356-57 (1981) (stating that the United States was one of the
most lenient countries in the world in interpreting diplomatic immunity).
68. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, §§ 2-6, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254c (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
69. Id. See B. SEN, supra note 5, at 83-91 (discussing how other countries treat
diplomatic immunity as a matter of their domestic law).
70. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, § 6(b), 22 U.S.C. § 254e (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
71. Id.
72. Id. §§ 2-6, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). There are vari-
ous examples of unsuccessful lawsuits brought under this provision against the insurers
of negligent diplomats. See Madoo v. Globe Am. Casualty Co., 650 F. Supp. 855, 857
(D. Md. 1986) (holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case
because the Nicaraguan diplomat's immunity at the time of the accident had expired
before the plaintiff had filed a complaint); Windsor v. State Farm Ins. Co., 509 F.
Supp. 342, 347 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 does
not apply retroactively).
73. Compare A New Regime, supra note 38, at 694-97 (outlining the inadequacies
of the insurance provisions of the Diplomatic Relations Act) with Comment, The Dip-
lomatic Relations Act, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 471, 478-80 (1979) [hereinafter Com-
ment, The Diplomatic Relations Act] (discussing the lack of enforcement mechanisms
under the Diplomatic Relations Act).
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Relations Act contribute to its failure. First, there is no remedy when
the diplomat is immune from jurisdiction and does not carry insur-
ance.7 4 Second, aside from the State Department withholding diplo-
matic license plates, there is no mandatory monitoring scheme that
forces foreign missions to obtain insurance.7 5 Third, even if the violat-
ing diplomat is insured, the Act limits coverage to $300,000 for per-
sonal injury and $50,000 for property damage.7 6 The damage limita-
tions are insufficient to cover extensive medical expenses resulting from
severe injuries caused by diplomats.7
II. HOW DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FUNCTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The executive branch possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether an alien in the United States has diplomatic immunity. Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter delegated this function to the Secretary of State in
1978."' The Secretary of State's power to confer or deny immunity is
strictly a political determination and is not subject to judicial review.80
74. Comment, The Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 73, at 480.
75. Id.
76. Compulsory Liability Insurance for Diplomatic Missions and Personnel, 22
C.F.R. § 151.4 (1988); see also 133 CONG. REC. S13,796 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987)
(evaluating the Senate's passage of an amendment to the Diplomatic Relations Act
that increases the minimum liability coverage to $1,000,000 and requires the Director
of the Office of Foreign Missions to take steps to ensure compliance with the higher
liability insurance requirements). But see infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text
(noting that the reform fails to address the major flaw of the Diplomatic Relations Act,
that it lacks enforcement mechanisms to ensure adequate compensation).
77. See Turan, supra note 46, at 10 (describing how, in 1974, a cultural attach6 at
the Panamanian Embassy ran a red light and crashed into Dr. Halla Brown, then a
clinical professor of medicine at George Washington University). The accident left Dr.
Brown a quadriplegic and forced her to relinquish her lucrative medical practice. Id.
The Panamanian Embassy offered condolences, but no compensation. Id. Even if the
diplomat was properly insured under the Act, the most Dr. Brown could have received
was $300,000. Compulsory Liability Insurance for Diplomatic Missions and Personnel,
22 C.F.R. § 151.4 (1988).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President "shall receive ambassa-
dors and other public ministers"); The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, § 4, 22
U.S.C. § 254c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (describing the implementation of this
provision).
79. Exec. Order No. 12,101, 43 Fed. Reg. 54,195 (1978), amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617 (1987).
80. See United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that
diplomatic status is only conferred by the executive branch); Carrera v. Carrera, 174
F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (asserting that immunity is established when recog-
nized by the State Department and transmitted to the court); United States v. Enger,
472 F. Supp. 490, 500-01 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that defendants, Soviet citizens who
were employees of the United Nations in New York City, charged with espionage of-
fenses, were not immune from prosecution under the Vienna Convention); Trost v.
Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 229 (D.C. 1945) (holding that conferring diplomatic status is
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Critics question the administration of the State Department over dip-
lomatic status determinations. The State Department held secret pro-
ceedings to evaluate handling of past cases of diplomatic crime.81 The
Department feared that adverse publicity would strain relations with
the countries involved.2 This policy portrays the insensitivity of the
State Department towards victims of violent crime, bringing adverse
publicity upon the Department. 3
Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County84 illustrates how a State
Department retroactive grant of diplomatic immunity attempted to pre-
vent potential strains in international relations.8 Responding to news-
paper reports alleging that the servants of a Saudi Prince living in Flor-
ida were forced to work twenty hours a day without contact with the
outside world and for slave wages, State attorneys for Dade County
a political question that is not challenged by courts). The court also considered whether
the defendants had an intimate association with the permanent diplomatic mission's
business. Id. at 506-07; see also Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 82-83, 88 A.2d 312, 317
(1952) (rejecting a claim of diplomatic immunity from an American servant to an
attach6 of a foreign embassy where the State Department asserted that the foreign
embassy did not formally notify the United States of the diplomatic status).
81. See Weiser & Knight, supra note 11, at A16 (quoting Richard Gookin, Associ-
ate Department of State Chief of Protocol, that with reference to the handling of inci-
dents involving diplomats, "[w]e want to handle them quietly; we believe it is in the
interest of our relations with embassies and foreign governments"). Chief of Protocol
Selwa Roosevelt noted that "... . the principle we're upholding is not to protect the guy
that's going through the stoplight, obviously, but to protect one of our people who
might be in a country . . . where he could be framed if he were not protected by
diplomatic immunity." Id.
Responding to a Freedom of Information Act request, an investigation uncovered an
internal State Department memorandum regarding the Kenneth Skeen incident, dis-
cussed supra note 12. The memorandum disclosed that officials from the State Depart-
ment went to visit the Brazilian who committed the assault to express "sorrow and
concern," but did not express similar regrets with the victim of the assault. Hearings
on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 62 (statement of Chuck Ashman,
author of DIPLOMATIC CRIME); see also Crime and Diplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post,
Jan. 10, 1984, at A16 (criticizing diplomatic immunity and stating that "[ci]rimes by
diplomats should be documented and publicized as if no diplomatic immunity ex-
isted"). "Our government should not be covering them up." Hearings on Diplomatic
Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 113 (statement of Arthur Rovine, former Chair-
man of the American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice)
(arguing that greater publicity of diplomatic crime would deter future crime by embar-
rassing the diplomat's government).
82. Weiser & Knight, supra note 11, at A16.
83. See id. (noting that complaints inundate the State Department when an inci-
dent involving diplomatic immunity is publicized).
84. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984).
85. See Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing a counterclaim brought against a plaintiff who acquired diplomatic immu-
nity status retroactively); see also supra note 16 (discussing the facts of the above cited
case).
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began investigating the matter.86 Police officers, with a search warrant,
went to the Prince's home and upon entrance were assaulted by body-
guards, the Prince's mother-in-law, and the Prince himself.87 The police
officers found no evidence of the slavery charges.
88
The Prince,8 9 who at the time of the incident did not have diplomatic
immunity, filed a $210 million civil rights suit against Dade County
law enforcement officials.90 Four police officers counterclaimed for
damages in tort.91 Responding to a request from the Saudi Govern-
ment, the State Department conferred a full retroactive grant of diplo-
matic immunity on the Prince. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the dismissal of the counterclaims against the prince basing its decision
on the retroactive grant of immunity. 93 The actions of the State De-
partment incensed Florida law enforcement officials, bringing into
question whether this retroactive grant of immunity abused the privi-
lege.94 Diplomatic crime cases, such as this, illustrate the dilemma con-
86. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 107-08.
87. Id. at 108-09.
88. Id. at 109.
89. See id. at 110-11 (stating that the Prince was the former Saudi Defense
Minister).
90. Id. at 110; see also Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1330
(11th Cir. 1984) (explaining the history of the case).
91. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at I10. See also, Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade
County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining the basis of the
counterclaim).
92. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 110; Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County,
741 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1984).
93. Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 1984).
Although the court held that the Prince's original bringing of a complaint did not con-
stitute a waiver of diplomatic immunity, article 32 of the Vienna Convention On Diplo-
matic Relations provides that once a diplomatic agent initiates judicial proceedings, he
cannot invoke this immunity with respect to any counterclaim connected with the origi-
nal claim. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 32. Under
this provision, it appears that the Prince's lawsuit arguably constitutes a waiver of his
future diplomatic status. Id.
94. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 111. Janet Reno, the Florida State Attor-
ney protested in a letter to the State Department: "All the evidence indicates that the
State Department took that action in response to pressure from the Saudi government
which wanted to keep one of the members of the royal family from being embar-
rassed." Id. Sergeant John Collins, one of the law enforcement officials involved in the
incident, said, "Something has got to be done to protect Americans in this country
from their own State Department." Id.
See also J. Anderson & D. Van Atta, The Long Arm of Diplomatic Immunity,
Wash. Post, June 6, 1988, at C15 (discussing an alleged retroactive grant of diplomatic
immunity by the State Department to a daughter of a deceased Lebanese leader fol-
lowing the institution of a civil suit against her).
Cf. infra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining State Department reactions to
negative public sentiment resulting from its handling of similar incidents involving dip-
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fronting local law enforcement. Police officers are trapped between the
international obligations of the United States to excuse offenses com-
mitted by diplomats, and their oath to uphold the law."'
Problems exist when police officers fail to investigate crimes after the
offender claims diplomatic immunity 0 In some cases, the offender may
not have diplomatic immunity for the act committed. 7 Reforms cur-
rently pending in Congress arguably assist police officers in handling
these sensitive incidentsYs These reforms do not alleviate the basic con-
lomats and discussing the efforts of the Department to assist law enforcement officers
in handling incidents involving diplomatic crime).
Pending legislation in the United States House of Representatives would prohibit
State Department officials from interfering in local law enforcement prosecution of
aliens and their family members who are members of a foreign mission, and who are
not immune from criminal jurisdiction under the Vienna Convention. H.R. 3036, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1987).
95. OFFICE OF PROTOCOL AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, U.S. DEPART.IENT
OF STATE, PUB. No. 9533, GUIDANCE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: PERSONAL
RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL (1987)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT]. Written to assist law enforcement
officials in ascertaining the status of individuals asserting the diplomatic privilege, the
booklet also guides the handling of these incidents. Id. at v.
A State Department representative testified that the guide emphasizes the necessity
for a complete police investigation following the incident in order to lay the basis for
possible future prosecution if immunity were terminated. Hearings on Diplomatic
Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 16 (statement of Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Pro-
tocol of the United States Department of State).
96. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 16-17 (state-
ment of Selwa Roosevelt). See Afghan Diplomat Accused of Auto Attack on Woman,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1987, at BI (describing how a high ranking Afghan diplomat to
the United Nations was accused of running over a woman with a car in a dispute over
a parking space). New York City police did not continue investigating into the inci-
dent, assuming the driver was immune. Id. The police never consulted United Nations
or State Department officials before making this determination. Id.; see, e.g., United
States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, 848-49 (4th Cir. 1985) (maintaining that alle-
gations of serious crimes can lead to the arrest of consular officials); United States v.
Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the Bulgarian defendant's
position in the trade office of the Bulgarian mission did not entitle him to immunity
without explicit State Department recognition); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp.
490, 500-01 (D.N.J. 1978) (holding that United Nations political affairs officials ac-
cused of espionage were not entitled to immunity because the acts alleged occurred
outside of their official capacity).
97. GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 95, at 7. The guide notes that
only a court of law can determine what constitutes an official act. Id. It does not em-
power either a law enforcement officer or a State Department official to make such a
determination. Id. In addition, the guide cautions that diplomatic passports, tax exemp-
tion cards, automobile registration, diplomatic license plates, and drivers licenses do not
conclusively reflect a diplomat's degree of privileges and immunities. Id. at 11-13.
98. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987). Pending legislation in the House
of Representatives, if enacted, would require the Director of the Office of Foreign Mis-
sions of the Department of State to educate law enforcement officials as to the extent
of immunity provided to members of foreign missions. Id. This legislation would also
require the director of the Office of Foreign Missions to encourage local law enforce-
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flict between the police officers' duty to uphold the law and diplomatic
immunity excusing unlawful conduct. 91
III. EXISTING REMEDIES IN RESPONSE TO DIPLOMATIC
CRIME
There are few effective remedies available to prosecute diplomats im-
mune from United States civil or criminal jurisdiction. Without the im-
position of meaningful sanctions, the problem of unaccountable diplo-
matic crime will continue. Presently, there are four alternatives that
are available to the United States.
A. THE Persona Non Grata PROCEDURE
Article 9 of the Vienna Convention allows the receiving state to de-
clare the person in question persona non grata (PNG). 100 The PNG
procedure enables the receiving state to declare a member of the mis-
sion unacceptable. 1°1 This requires expulsion of that member from the
United States. 02 The United States infrequently utilizes this rem-
edy, 0 3 as critics argue that its use could conceivably create tension be-
tween the nations involved.'
0 4
Under the present scheme, the victim is left with no reasonable
means to secure compensation. Recovery would require the victim to
bring suit against the offending diplomat in the sending state. Insur-
mountable financial, cultural, logistical, and political limitations se-
verely limit the possibilities of success in a foreign forum05
ment officials to prosecute members of foreign missions that commit crimes, in a man-
ner consistent with international law. Id.
99. See Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 76-78, 83-
88 (statements of Peter Christiansen, a retired New York City police detective, and
Dennis Martin, National President of the American Federation of Police Officers) (dis-
cussing the effects of diplomatic immunity on effective law enforcement and public
opinion).
100. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 9.
101. Id. The State Department does not need to offer any reason when making a
persona non grata declaration. Id.
102. Id.
103. The Effect of the Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 66, at 362.
104. Note, Sovereign Immunity: Liability for a Violent Tort Committed by a Dip-
lomat - Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 506, 510 (1984).
Conversely, advocates claim that greater use of the persona non grata procedure is an
effective way to prevent the criminal from committing further crimes in the United
States. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 112 (statement
of Arthur Rovine, Former Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Inter-
national Law and Practice).
105. Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1532-33. The author notes that
diplomats are only immune to trial in the receiving state; they can be prosecuted
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B. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows the sending state to
waive the diplomat's immunity.10 The drafters included this provision
to allow a sending state to contest civil claims in domestic courts when
waiver would not impede the daily performance of the foreign mis-
sion. 101 The Vienna Convention requires the sending state to make an
express waiver of this privilege.10 One commentator has argued, how-
ever, that a diplomat's lawbreaking activity can constitute a construc-
tive waiver of diplomatic immunity.Y09
As a matter of practice, the sending state will not subject its diplo-
abroad. Id. The author also notes, however, the financial, cultural, logistical, and politi-
cal problems such lawsuits pose to the prosecuting victim. Id. Few victims possess the
resources to pursue such an action. Id.
106. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 32, para. 1.
107. United Nations Conference, supra note 47, at 49.
108. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 32, para. 2. In
order to waive diplomatic immunity, a foreign envoy must obtain the sending state's
consent. 4 Am. JUR. 2D Ambassadors and Consuls § 10 (1962). One court in Great
Britain has held, however, that the diplomat may waive immunity where there is no
interference with the diplomatic function. Id; see Fatemi v. United States, 192 A.2d
525, 528 (D.C. 1963) (stating that diplomatic authorities may waive an embassy's dip-
lomatic immunity and request local police to enter the building for purposes of law
enforcement).
109. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 2-3 (arguing that Libyan "diplomats" in
Great Britain had forfeited their right to be recognized as bonafide diplomatic agents
when they engaged in terrorist activities); see also State Sponsored Terrorism, supra
note 17, at 150-51 (asserting that because Libya's actions had violated the "functional
premise" of the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations). Specifically, article 41,
paragraph 3, prevents using the diplomatic mission in any manner incompatible with
the functions of the mission. Id. By undertaking terrorist activities, which are incontro-
vertibly outside of a reasonable diplomatic function, the "diplomats" had forfeited their
diplomatic status. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing the func-
tional necessity theoretical base of diplomatic immunity).
But see Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1533-34 and accompanying notes
(criticizing Justice Goldberg's assertion as lacking support both in state practice and in
international law). Justice Goldberg's belief that unlawful acts breach diplomatic sta-
tus and permit receiving states to arrest offending diplomats is not supported as a mat-
ter of state practice in international law. Id. But Justice Goldberg properly raised the
question: Should civilized nations tolerate this kind of behavior on the ground that it is
the diplomat's work and functions that are protected? Id.; see infra notes 193-94 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the traditional notion of diplomatic immunity
should be the subject of a new international debate).
Under article 60, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention On The Law Of Treaties,
opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in S I.L.M.
679, 701 (1969), a party affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty can
invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. Applying the
principle of diplomatic immunity, as codified in the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic
Relations, crimes committed by diplomats could breach article 41. Note, The Limits of
International Legal Privilege, 58 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 531, 532 (1984). The aggrieved
state could suspend the immunity provisions of the treaty, allowing that state to prose-
cute the offending diplomat. Id.
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mats to the criminal or civil jurisdiction of the receiving state."0 Al-
though the sending state may not opt to waive the immunity of its dip-
lomats in the receiving state, this does not preclude the sending state
from prosecuting the crime.11' Little information, however, is available
on whether foreign countries hold their diplomats accountable for their
crimes and torts committed in the United States."'
C. TERMINATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The receiving state can break relations with the sending state. Fol-
lowing the murder of British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, by gunfire
that came from inside the Libyan "People's Bureau," Great Britain
terminated diplomatic relations with Libya."13 Similarly, the United
States, after much internal debate, broke diplomatic relations with Iran
after terrorists seized the United States Embassy in Tehran and held
52 United States nationals hostage.'" 4 These two incidents provide ex-
amples of the extreme conditions necessary for governments to termi-
nate diplomatic relations. Governments will not, as a matter of course,
resort to such a drastic measure."
15
110. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 113 (statement
of Arthur Rovine, former chairman of the American Bar Association's Section of In-
ternational Law and Practice). Mr. Rovine also suggested establishing bilateral waiver
agreements with certain countries. Id. The United States could choose countries with
which to mutually agree to waive immunity. Id. These agreements could contain an
escape clause allowing a country to opt out when waiver threatens national security. Id.
Bilateral agreements enlarging the scope of immunity exist between the United States
and the Soviet Union, East Germany, and China. Id.
In one unique case, the State Department negotiated the waiver of diplomatic immu-
nity with the government of Guatemala to enable prosecution of two Guatemalan dip-
lomats implicated in the kidnapping of a former Salvadoran Ambassador's wife. Wer-
ner, 4 More Held in Abduction of Ex-Envoy's Wife, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1983, at 2.
111. Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1532-33.
112. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 35-36 (state-
ment of Sen. Spector). United States diplomats, with some exceptions, are well-be-
haved abroad. Id. In Great Britain, the behavior of the United States diplomatic corps
is described as exemplary. Cowper, Diplomacy Old and New, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1985,
at 2. For examples of United States diplomats abusing diplomatic immunity abroad,
see DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 114-27. United States diplomats who commit
offenses abroad, and for whom immunity is asserted, are still subjected to criminal,
civil, and military jurisdiction in the United States. Id. The United States has prose-
cuted several offenders in the United States, handing out harsh sanctions in certain
instances for crimes committed abroad. Id.
113. State Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 17, at 134-36.
114. See G. SICK, ALL FALL DOWN: AMERICA'S TRAGIC ENCOUNTER WITH IRAN,
288-89 (1985) (describing the reluctance with which governments break relations). It
was not until five months after the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran,
along with 52 American hostages, that the United States terminated diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran. Id.
115. Id.; cf. State Sponsored Terrorism, supra note 17, at 159-65 (questioning
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D. STATE DEPARTMENT MEASURES
The State Department possesses wide policy determining powers
which include the mediation of relations between the United States
government and foreign missions."" The State Department Chief of
Protocol, Selwa Roosevelt, testified before a Senate committee on a
number of sanctions available to curtail abuses of diplomatic immu-
nity.117 The first measure bars the serious offender from reentering the
United States."" The State Department attempts to accomplish this
through an automated visa lookout system.119 The State Department
acknowledges, however, that on at least three occasions, this system
failed to work. 2 0
The second sanction addresses the issue of juvenile perpetrators of
crime. Under this sanction, expulsion of the entire family from the
United States is possible. Selwa Roosevelt's testimony cites instances
where the Department had expelled entire families from the United
States when the child of the diplomat perpetrated the crime. 1 2 This
whether after the Libyan "People's Bureau" incident the civilized world should con-
tinue to diplomatically recognize nations such as Libya and Iran which sanction crimi-
nal behavior as a matter of state policy); Goldberg, supra note 17, at 1-2 (noting that
international law is not a suicide pact for civilized nations).
116. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text (explaining the powers dele-
gated to the State Department to determine immunity and citing an example of how a
retroactive grant of immunity is possible); see infra notes 117-28 and accompanying
text (assessing different policy options at the disposal of the State Department).
117. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 6-20 (state-
ment of Hon. Selwa Roosevelt, Chief of Protocol of the United States Department of
State).
118. Id. at 14.
119. Id. Entry visas are revocable for violations of local or federal law. Id. If the
violator attempts to obtain another visa to reenter the United States, the consul author-
ized to grant the visa and United States ports of entry will delay the immigration
procedure, while seeking State Department advice on allowing entrance. Id.
120. Id. at 15. One particular example illustrates the procedure. The Saudi Ara-
bian diplomat's son, who had diplomatic immunity, voluntarily left the United States
after committing rape. 133 CONG. REc. S13,799-80 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement
of "Judy", mother of sixteen year old victim of rape perpetrated by the son of a Saudi
Arabian diplomat and the son of a World Bank official on January 29, 1983). Some
months later, the victim encountered the perpetrator at her place of employment. Id.
Responding to a State Department inquiry, the Saudi Arabian Embassy claimed that it
was the perpetrator's brother the victim saw, and that the perpetrator was out of the
country. Id. The rapist's mother then moved to a house directly across the street from
the victim, where the rapist continued to torment the victim. Id. The Saudi Embassy
maintained throughout that the rapist was not in the country. Id. Prior to a private
investigator photographing the rapist, no one offered any conclusive proof to the State
Department that the perpetrator was indeed in the United States. Id. The rapist finally
left the country. Id.
121. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 17 (statement
of Hon. Selwa Roosevelt).
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policy seeks to ensure that diplomats, as parents, are fully accountable
for the acts of their children.
22
A third tactic used since 1984 monitors diplomatic traffic viola-
tions.123 The Office of Foreign Missions of the State Department uses a
standardized point system to evaluate diplomats' observance of traffic
regulations.2 If a diplomat accumulates eight points over a two year
period, or drives even once under the influence of alcohol, the State
Department revokes the diplomat's driving privileges. 125
The issuance of identity cards facilitates determinations of a diplo-
mat's immunity status.2 6 These cards, along with providing basic iden-
tity information about the person in question, identify the immunity
status of the foreign national. 21 If issued uniformly to all foreign diplo-
mats, this measure could help to eliminate problems in assessing
whether the diplomat has immunity or not. 28
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. A CLAIMS FUND
Theorists have proposed the establishment of a claims fund to com-
pensate those injured by diplomats.' 29 Under this proposal, victims who
could not successfully bring actions under the Diplomatic Relations
Act could draw compensation from a United States government funded
financial pool.'13 This proposal sought to provide compensation for in-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The State Department uses the standardized point system of the American
Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators. Id.
125. Id. Prior to the Senate hearings, the State Department permanently suspended
fifteen drivers licenses. Id. From the standpoint of the victim, this reactive policy does
not assist at all in compensation. Id. Such a system, however, may prevent future inci-
dents involving particularly reckless or careless diplomats. Id.
126. Id. at 18.
127. Guidance for Law Enforcement, supra note 95, at 13. There are three types of
identification cards. Id. Cards with a blue border identify diplomats, red bordered
cards identify consular officials, and green bordered cards identify employees. Id. The
guide recommends verification of diplomatic status where there is doubt as to the valid-
ity of the card or to the claim of diplomatic status. Id. The guide provides twenty-four
hour phone numbers to assist in verification. Id. at 13-14.
128. See id. (indicating that the police guide provides no indication as to how these
cards are distributed); see also Hearings on Diplomatic Crime Legislation, supra note
36 (offering no distribution guidance).
129. Comment, Compensation for "'Victims" of Diplomatic Immunity in the
United States: A Claims Fund Proposal, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 135, 149-59 (1980)
[hereinafter Claims Fund Proposal]; Recent Development, Diplomatic Immunity: Im-
plementing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 827, 829-31 (1978).
130. Claims Fund Proposal, supra note 129, at 149.
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jured citizens where the diplomats who caused injury were both im-
mune from jurisdiction and carried no liability insurance."'
The proposal required the State Department to establish a "Bureau
of Claims" to ascertain causation of injuries stemming from instances
involving a diplomat." 2 The bureau would then determine the amount
of compensation due to the victim.13 The success of this proposal re-
quires the diplomat's participation in the compensation procedure. The
diplomat becomes a "witness" in the determination of liability, without
affecting diplomatic immunity status.""
Under the proposal, the United States government finances the
claims fund. 35 After settling with the victim, the State Department
would then seek reimbursement from the mission.13 Among the tactics
proposed to encourage voluntary reimbursement from the foreign mis-
sion are to extend bilateral immunity agreements to participating coun-
tries,13 to implement the persona non grata procedure, 38 and to apply
political and economic pressure against the sending states of offending
diplomats. 39
131. Id. at 149-50.
132. Id. at 152-53. The author proposes that the Director of the Bureau of Claims
make two determinations. Id. First, the Director determines whether a diplomat, enti-
tled to immunity, caused the injury. Id. Second, the Director ascertains whether the
victim has a remedy under the Diplomatic Relations Act. Id. If the Director finds that
both conditions are satisfied, compensation is awarded from the claims fund. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 157-58.
135. Id. at 153-54. There is an ongoing debate as to who should "pay" for our
international obligations. Id. The author gives two reasons why the United States
should finance the claims fund. Id. First, the State Department has a much better
chance of obtaining reimbursement from the foreign mission. Id. The State Depart-
ment is conceivably better equipped to conduct international diplomacy than an injured
plaintiff's tort attorney. Id. Second, by financing the claims fund, the United States
government incurs the expense necessary to insure effective diplomatic relations. Id. at
154-55. Uncertainty exists as to whether a policy of allowing diplomats to go unprose-
cuted for crimes actually contributes to the domestic security in the United States. Id.
136. Id. at 154.
137. Id. at 155. The agreements could extend more or less favorable treatment
depending on the country's willingness to compensate victims. Id. The United States
has special bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, China, and East Germany.
Guidance for Law Enforcement, supra note 95, at 6 n.4. These agreements extend the
immunity normally only available to diplomatic agents to all members of the embassy
staff. Id. These agreements, however, have no provisions for reimbursement. Id.
138. Claims Fund Proposal, supra note 129, at 155-56. See supra notes 103-05
and accompanying text (discussing the governmental reluctance to use the persona non
grata sanction).
139. Claims Fund Proposal, supra note 129, at 156. Exercising political and eco-
nomic pressure might amount to a viable tactic in encouraging compensation, but past
State Department practice, clearly demonstrates that pressure is only exerted in partic-
ularly egregious cases. Nossiter, North Korean Envoy Pleads Guilty to Sex Abuse
Charge, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1983, at B3. The State Department refused to accord
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The claims fund proposal contains some fundamental flaws. In all
probability, foreign missions will not voluntarily reimburse the claims
bureau. If the mission refuses to compensate the Bureau of Claims for
damages expended to compensate a victim of a diplomat's wrongdoing,
the State Department has limited avenues of recourse. 140 Furthermore,
American taxpayers are unlikely to support a proposition requiring the
United States government to assume financial responsibility for a for-
eign diplomat's wrongdoing.
41
B. A MANDATORY INSURANCE SCHEME
One commentator advocates the implementation of a mandatory in-
surance scheme to solve the problem of diplomatic immunity abuse.
14 1
The proposed scheme requires embassies to obtain insurance for their
diplomats and staff as a prerequisite to maintain diplomatic relations
with the United States. 43 Consequently, this type of plan imposes an
affirmative duty on the private insurance industry in the United States
to insure diplomats.4 The commentator argues, however, that the leg-
islation is not enforceable unless there is a right of direct action against
the insurer.14 5 In response to these concerns, current legislation con-
tains such a provision. 46
diplomatic immunity in a case of sexual abuse committed by a North Korean diplomat,
O Nam Chol. Id. Because North Korea has only observer status at the United Nations
and does maintain diplomatic relations with the United States, State Department offi-
cials contend that Mr. 0 was only immune for acts arising out of his official duties. Id.
Mr. 0 took refuge in the North Korean mission for 10 months before pleading guilty to
charges of sexual abuse. Id. The court dismissed the case after Mr. 0 agreed to leave
the United States without the right of return. Id.
In another case, after positive identification implicated Manuel Ayree, the 19 year
old son of a low ranking Ghanian diplomat, in at least two rapes in New York City, the
State Department asked Ghana's mission to the United Nations to either send Mr.
Ayree home or waive his diplomatic immunity and consent to criminal charges. Mc-
Fadden: Repatriation, supra note 15, at 33; see supra note 15 (providing a further
description of this incident).
140. Claims Fund Proposal, supra note 129, at 156-57.
141. See McFadden, The U.N. and the City: Obligation, Opportunity and Irrita-
tion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at AIO (noting that New Yorkers feel that diplo-
matic immunity represents a license for United Nations personnel to park illegally,
ignore bills, summonses, and criminal charges, and generally to act insensitively).
142. See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1537-47 (recommending a
mandatory insurance scheme to address abuses of diplomatic immunity).
143. See id. at 1538 (discussing the consequences of an existing embassy refusing
to obtain the proper insurance, or refusing to obtain any insurance at all).
144. Id. at 1539-42.
145. Id. at 1542.
146. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, §§ 2-6, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982
& Supp. IV 1986).
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Anticipating reluctance from the insurance industry,4 7 the proposal
borrows two facets from nuclear power plant insurance schemes. The
plan utilizes an insurance pool, to spread the risk of insuring countries
likely to abuse the privilege. 1 4 The plan also places caps on the insur-
ers' liability, protecting insurance companies from unlimited liability. 4
Damages resulting from an incident involving significant personal in-
jury illustrates the potential heavy burdens placed on the insurance in-
dustry if Congress approved an unlimited liability policy.
Regardless of the proposed limitations on liability for insurance com-
panies, this proposal is defective because it assumes that the insurance
industry would willingly insure foreign embassies.160 This is a highly
unrealistic assumption.151 The insurance industry legitimately fears
that juries will view insurers as possessing unlimited funds and return
high damage awards to plaintiffs. Therefore, insurance companies
may not readily participate in this scheme.
C. A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CRIMINAL COURT
One commentator has proposed the establishment of a Permanent
International Diplomatic Criminal Court (court) with mandatory juris-
diction over diplomats accused of committing criminal acts. 3 This
proposal places the court in an inquisitorial mode, with the court acting
as both the prosecution and the defense.' This court would have the
power to impose monetary fines and, if necessary, to imprison diplo-
mats in its own penal facilities."55
The practical advantages of this proposal are twofold. First, the
court could operate free from the potential unfair bias of local proceed-
ings.15 6 Second, the use of a court outside a bilateral relations structure
147. See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1542 n.131 (examining the
contention that compensating victims of abuses of diplomatic immunity is a social and
governmental problem, placed on the government and not on the private insurance
industry).
148. Id. at 1541.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1540.
151. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 125 (statement
of Ronald Sol Mlotek, Chief Legal Counsel, Office of Foreign Missions, United States
Department of State) (emphasizing that no insurance carrier would write policies in-
suring policyholders for the commission of intentional torts). See also Insuring Against
Abuse, supra note 38, at 1542 n.131 (noting insurance industry opposition to an insur-
ance plan for foreign embassies).
152. Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1542 n.131.
153. Amending the Vienna Convention, supra note 30, at 185-88.
154. Id. at 186.
155. Id. at 187.
156. Id. at 187-88.
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precludes the termination of diplomatic relations in extreme cases. 1 7
This proposal has some distinct advantages and is one worth further
examination.
D. THE PENDING DIPLOMATIC CRIMES LEGISLATION
In response to controversy in the United States over abuses of the
diplomatic privilege, Senator Jesse Helms introduced the Diplomatic
Immunity Abuse Prevention Act (the Act) into the Senate on October
8, 1987.15" In addition, various members of the House of Representa-
tives introduced similar measures. 159 The Senate initially approved the
Act as part of an authorization bill for the State Department, but the
proposal is currently stalled in Congress. 60 Although the Act favorably
addresses some of the problems associated with diplomatic crime, the
refusal of both the Senate and the House to narrow the scope of diplo-
matic immunity in any significant way hampers its effectiveness.
The Act imposes certain duties on the Director of the State Depart-
ment's Office of Foreign Missions in order to assist local law enforce-
ment. The Director must maintain records on every incident involving
an immune diplomat and submit annual reports on these incidents to
Congress."6' The legislation requires the Director to educate local law
enforcement officials on the levels of immunity different diplomats pos-
sess16 2 and to assure the prosecution of diplomats within the limitations
imposed by the Vienna Convention. 6 3 To ensure vigilant police proce-
dure, the Act prohibits State Department officials from influencing any
157. Id. at 185.
158. Diplomatic Immunity Abuse Prevention Act, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC.
S13,795, S13,795-97 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Abuse Prevention Act]. The
Act, as suggested by Senator Helms, is a first step in the direction of curtailing the
abuses of diplomatic immunity. Id. at S13,797.
159. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
160. Dewar, Senate Votes Immunity Deterrent, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1987, at A20.
161. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 2(a), at 13,796. This measure will
force the State Department to publicize incidents of diplomatic crime, which arguably
will embarrass the sending states and have a deterrent effect. Hearings on Diplomatic
Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 113 (statement of Arthur Rovine, former chair-
man of the American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice).
See Dewar, supra note 160 (quoting a spokesperson for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee who stated that the legislation could have a significant deterrent impact
without violating the principle of diplomatic immunity).
162. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 2(b)(1), at S13,796. See GUIDANCE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 95 (stating in layman's terms the different types
of diplomatic immunities and suggested police procedures for incidents involving
diplomats).
163. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 2(b)(2), at S13,769. See supra notes
94-97 and accompanying text (describing the problems of police failure to fully investi-
gate crimes committed when the suspect claims diplomatic immunity).
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police investigation of a diplomatic crime.1
The Act also mandates the development of procedures to identify
members of foreign missions in the United States who actually have
immunity.16 5 Upon initiating the criminal prosecution of an individual
covered under this Act, the foreign minister of the sending state must
explicitly assert immunity in the form of a message to the chief of the
United States mission in the sending state, who then relays the message
to the Secretary of State.16 6 These provisions attempt to address the
uncertainty of a diplomat's immunity status, unwarranted interference
by the State Department, 67 and other problems local law enforcement
faces when a diplomat commits a crime.1 68
The legislation also contains provisions requiring the State Depart-
ment to formally request a waiver of immunity. Under the Act, when a
diplomat commits a crime of violence,169 and a court issues a summons
for that person to appear in court, the Secretary of State must request
the waiver of immunity from the diplomat's sending state. If the send-
ing state does not waive immunity, the Secretary must immediately de-
164. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 2(c)(1), at S13,796. The legislative
history suggests that Congress inserted this provision to avoid similar misfortune result-
ing from the past interference of the State Department in the investigation process. Id.
at S13,797. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (portraying an incident
where the State Department granted retroactive immunity to a former Saudi defense
minister). The actions of the State Department in that case appeared as a deliberate
interference in the duties of local law enforcement officials. Id.
If the Secretary of State determines that important foreign policy considerations or
national security concerns demands such action, he can waive this provision. Abuse
Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 2(c)(2), at S13,796. The Act mandates reports to
Congress explaining each waiver. Id.
165. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 3, at S13,796. See supra notes 129-
30 and accompanying text (describing the use of identification cards by foreign diplo-
mats). This provision directs the State Department to develop and implement registra-
tion and departure procedures for members of foreign missions. Id. This provision could
complement the identification card scheme, by creating a computer database for rapid
identification of those that have immunity. Id.
166. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 11, at S13,796.
167. See supra notes 84-94 (citing an example of State Department interference in
a judicial proceeding through the granting of retroactive diplomatic immunity).
168. 133 CONG. REC. S13,804 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Pell).
169. Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
defines a crime of violence as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.
Id. The proposed legislation adds the following crimes which are particularly applicable
to the conduct of diplomats: "Reckless driving or driving while intoxicated or under the
influence of alcohol or drugs." Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 13(1), at
S13,797.
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clare the individual persona non grata and require the individual to
leave the United States. 170 In addition, the deported individual cannot
return to the United States."' If enacted, this provision would force the
State Department to use the waiver and persona non grata provisions
more extensively.
The legislation restricts the statutory definition of a diplomatic fam-
ily member." 2 The Act amends the relevant provision of the Diplo-
matic Relations Act which defines the family of the member of a for-
eign mission. 3 Furthermore, the proposal restricts coverage to the
members of the family forming the diplomat's household.7 4 The Act
defines family members as spouses of members of the mission under the
age of twenty-one, unmarried children under the age of twenty-three
provided these children are full-time college students, and under special
circumstances with State Department permission, other persons who
reside exclusively in the mission member's household. 75 The more re-
strictive definition denies the immunity defense to older children of dip-
lomats stationed in the United States. 7
In addition, the Act increases the minimum amount of insurance
coverage that foreign missions are required to carry. The insurance
coverage requirements will increase from $300,000 to $1,000,000 per
incident.' 8 To assure enforcement of this provision, the Act compels
the Director of the Office of Foreign Mission to implement regulations
ensuring compliance with the new limits. 7
19
The proposed legislation fails to address two of the main problems
concerning insurance coverage under the Diplomatic Relations Act.
Like the Diplomatic Relations Act, the Act contains no means for the
victim to recover when a foreign mission does not carry insurance. 180
170. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 4(a)(2), at S13,797. An identical
provision was introduced in the House. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1987).
171. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 4(c), at S13,796.
172. Id. § 8, at S13,796.
173. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, § 2(2), 22 U.S.C. § 254a(2) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
174. Id.
175. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 8, at S13,796.
176. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 18. According
to the State Department, this measure is currently utilized in practice. Id.
177. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 9, at S13,796.
178. Id. The House provision is identical. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8
(1987).
179. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 10, at S13,796.
180. See The Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 65, at 480 (stating that the
legislation only increases the minimum amount of coverage, but does not make cover-
age mandatory for foreign missions because of the absence of enforcement provisions).
The House version, however, makes victims of crimes committed by diplomats with
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Also, the proposed legislation does not prescribe a mandatory enforce-
ment mechanism that penalizes a foreign mission for not obtaining in-
surance.""" While raising the minimum standard for insurance coverage
to $1,000,000 may help to compensate adequately victims of accidents
caused by diplomats, lack of an enforcement component limits the ef-
fectiveness of the provision. 82
Finally, the proposed legislation authorizes the President to take nec-
essary steps to prevent illegal use of the diplomatic pouch, such as
transporting weapons or illegal narcotics. 83 This provision is consistent
with international law, as the Vienna Convention limits the contents of
the diplomatic pouch to documents and articles intended for official
diplomatic use."" There are two possible measures to prevent unlawful
use of the diplomatic pouch while at the same time ensuring the confi-
dentiality of diplomatic correspondence.' 85 Customs officials pass diplo-
matic pouches through a magnetometer,180 an X-ray machine that de-
tects weapons, without breaching the confidentiality of the documents
contained in the pouch. This process takes only seconds and strikes a
balance between excessively delaying the arrival of the pouch from
abroad and exercising the inalienable right of the sovereign to protect
itself from the importation of illegal weapons or drugs.
1 87
immunity from criminal jurisdiction eligible to receive victim compensation and assis-
tance under the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, § 1403, 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987).
181. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing why the lack of
enforcement provisions in the Diplomatic Relations Act render it ineffective).
182. Id.
183. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, § 12, at S13,797. The House version is
similar. H.R. 3036, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1987). See Thorny Issue: Peeking into
a Privileged Pouch, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1988, at B6 (discussing disputes over possible
implications of permitting inspection of the diplomatic pouch).
184. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 27, para. 4.
185. See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1535 n.95 (citing in contrast,
Higgins, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: The Recent United
Kingdom Experience, 79 Aht. J. INT'L L. 641, 647-48 (1985) that X-ray machines
could ascertain the sensitive information about the types of ciphers used to send
messages). By allowing only the customs official to conduct the search, it minimizes the
concern over disclosure of sensitive methods of communication. Id. A customs official
will not ordinarily have knowledge of different types of communications devices. Id.
The fundamental principle underlying the diplomatic pouch, which was to protect
the communications between the foreign government and its representative abroad, was
formulated in a less sophisticated era of communications. Griffin, Diplomatic Impu-
nity, 13 STUDENT LAW. 18, 20 (1984). Modern methods of instantaneous telecommuni-
cation antiquate the protectionist need for the diplomatic pouch. Id.
186. W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(h), at 197-98
(1985). Airports, penal institutions, military installations, and government buildings
commonly use a magnetometer to detect weapons. Id.
187. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 624 (1977). The Court in Ramsey
noted that border searches are made pursuant to the sovereign's right to take protec-
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Custom agents can also utilize the services of a narcotics detection
dog to sniff for the presence of contraband. 18 8 As with the X-ray ma-
chine, the dog sniff is a rapid, unobtrusive procedure that preserves the
confidentiality of documents inside the pouch. 8 ' If either procedure ex-
posed the presence of weapons or narcotics, customs officials could re-
quire the opening of the pouch in the presence of an official from the
sending foreign nation. If the foreign representative refuses to allow
inspection of the pouch, customs officials could decline the pouch en-
trance into the United States. 90
Both methods would not violate article 27(3) of the Vienna Conven-
tion, 191 which prevents opening or detaining the diplomatic pouch.92
Neither of the suggested methods physically opens the diplomatic
pouch, nor do they substantially delay the entrance of the pouch. These
methods enable a nation state to protect its interests and to promote
diplomatic relations.
As a whole, the bill is a small step toward alleviating problems con-
nected with the abuses of diplomatic immunity. Enactment of the bill
would send a message to foreign missions conducting diplomatic rela-
tions in the United States that the American people will not tolerate a
privileged class of diplomats who are above the law. Unfortunately, this
message was sent in the past, without much success. The fundamental
flaws of the bill are a lack of enforcement provisions for the insurance
scheme and a failure to address the permissible scope of diplomatic
immunity. Congress still needs to enact the significant reforms." 3
tionist measures to protect itself. Id. at 616. Scanning the diplomatic bag with an X-
ray machine is a wholly appropriate limited means by which the United States can
exercise the right to ensure its own safety. Id.
188. LAFAVE AND ISRAEL, supra note 186, § 3.2(b), at 101. Police have recently
made use of the trained dog to detect the presence of narcotics or explosives. Id.
189. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (describing the limited
nature of the canine sniff). The Court noted that use of the canine sniff does not re-
quire opening the luggage or exposing items inside the luggage. Id. The Court reasoned
that the canine sniff discloses only the presence of contraband narcotics. Id. The Court
stated that a canine sniff does not constitute a search in the context of the fourth
amendment. Id.
190. Goldberg, supra note 17, at 4. As Justice Goldberg noted in commenting on
the reluctance of British officials to open the Libyan diplomatic pouch during the Lib-
yan "People's Bureau" incident, "It defies reason to interpret the [Vienna] Convention
so as to prevent the opening of the diplomatic bag where there is substantial evidence
that it contains murder weapons or, for example, conventional or nuclear bombs." Id.
191. See Higgins, supra note 185, at 647-49 (stating that the transportation of
nondiplomatic material in the diplomatic bag abuses the privilege of the diplomatic bag
and requires forfeiture of the protections of the convention).
192. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 27, para. 3.
193. 133 CONG. REC. S13,798 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Helms).
Senator Helms, cosponsor of the Diplomatic Crimes legislation, stated that this ap-
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V. THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE
Today diplomatic immunity often contradicts fundamental principles
of justice in civilized countries. Defenders of diplomatic immunity
maintain that the trade-off between preserving harmonious interna-
tional relations and protecting American diplomats abroad while al-
lowing those who have engaged in wrongdoing to escape sanction is
acceptable."" The consequences of the trade-off is justification for the
international community to reevaluate the principle of diplomatic
immunity.
A. UNILATERAL MEASURES
A proposed Senate bill195 removes the immunity from the adminis-
trative, technical, and service staff of the foreign missions. The bill sub-
jects these staff members to United States criminal jurisdiction for
crimes of violence.1 96 Diplomatic immunity is granted only to diplo-
matic agents. 97 Although the Senate rejected the bill" 9 in favor of a
compromise measure,' 99 the basic approach of the bill addresses a sig-
nificant loophole in the principle of diplomatic immunity. Specifically,
the bill removes immunity from those who are not diplomats."' Be-
proach was a compromise to an earlier proposed bill, S. 1437, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), that subjected members of foreign missions and consulates other than the dip-
lomatic agents and consular officers themselves to the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States for crimes of violence. Id. Senator Helms stated that this measure would
be appropriate until the Senate limits diplomatic immunity. Id. See infra notes 202-06
and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of adopting a more narrow definition of
immunity).
194. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 7-13 (state-
ment of Mrs. Selwa Roosevelt) (discussing how diplomatic immunity ensures the secur-
ity of United States diplomats based abroad and changing this policy undermines
United States international obligations).
195. S. 1437, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
196. ld; see supra note 153 (providing a statutory definition of a crime of violence).
197. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 1, para. e.
The legislation defines diplomatic agents as the heads of the foreign mission and their
diplomatic staff. Id. The bill continues the Convention's extension of diplomatic immu-
nity to the families of the diplomatic agent. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legisla-
tion, supra note 36, at 10 (statement of Mrs. Selwa Roosevelt).
198. Dewar, supra note 160, at A20.
199. Abuse Prevention Act, supra note 158, §§ 1-13, at S13,795-797; see supra
notes 156-91 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the proposed
legislation).
200. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 1, para. g-h.
Both the service staff and the private servant provide only domestic services for the
mission and in no way engage in the conduct of international relations. Diplomatic
Crime, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1987, at 36. Immunity from prosecution for criminal acts
should not extend to nondiplomats. Id. As the Wall Street Journal mused in an edito-
rial, .... why extend [diplomatic immunity] to people whose closest link with foreign
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cause low-level staff and personal servants of the foreign mission perpe-
trate many of these crimes,201 this measure would, conceivably, allevi-
ate a great deal of the problem.
A second approach is a more restrictive interpretation of diplomatic
immunity. Following a recent drunk driving incident involving the am-
bassador to the United States from Papua New Guinea, the State De-
partment made an unprecedented request to the United States Attor-
ney to prepare a criminal case against the ambassador.0 2 The move of
the State Department suggests a new, narrower interpretation of diplo-
matic immunity.203 Although the ambassador retains immunity because
of absolute immunity granted to diplomatic agents in international
law, 204 the charge means that if the ambassador left the country, the
former diplomat could not reenter as a diplomat, and upon reentry, the
former diplomat becomes vulnerable to prosecution on the criminal
charge.05 The action of the State Department, if put into practice as
policy, at least sends a message to the diplomatic community that crim-
inal offenses are intolerable.208
B. A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF RECIPROCITY
The main practical reason cited for continuing diplomatic immunity
in the face of constant abuse of the privilege is the political reality of
policy may be chauffeuring an ambassador about town?" Id.
It was recently asserted that the proposed bill is consistent with the Vienna Conven-
tion On Diplomatic Relations. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note
36, at 803-04 (statement of Pamela Trescott, Esq.). Because the Convention focuses on
the function of the diplomat and also mandates good behavior, enforcing the Conven-
tion is accomplished by prosecuting service staff and private servant personnel. Id.
201. 133 CONG. REC. S13,801 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (testimony of Chuck Ash-
man, author of DIPLOMATIC CRIME).
202. Barker, Criminal Charge Possible for Envoy, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at
B I. See supra note 10 (describing the Abisinito incident).
203. Id.; see Larschan, The Abisinito Affair: A Restrictive Theory of Diplomatic
Immunity?, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 291-95 (1988) (confirming that the
State Department has adopted a more restrictive view of diplomatic immunity). The
author concluded from the Abisinito incident that the United States will prosecute for-
eign diplomats so long as the accreditation of the diplomat is no longer valid. Id. at
285. Further, the author argues that this position is inconsistent with the policy consid-
erations underlying diplomatic immunity. Id. at 294-95. Such State Department ac-
tions, however, may have the effect of alerting foreign governments to the problems
presented by diplomatic immunity. Application of the Restrictive Theory, supra note
43, at 540 (arguing that "exemption from legal process in even the most egregious
circumstances creates a privileged class incompatible with the democratic climate of
the democratic state, as well as antithetical to the ends of diplomacy").
204. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, arts. 29, 31.
205. Barker, supra note 202, at B1.
206. Id. (statement of Joseph E. DiGenova, then United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia); Application of the Restrictive Theory, supra note 43, at 540.
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reciprocity. °0 Some commentators fear direct foreign governmental re-
sponses in the form of fabricated charges against United States foreign
service officers abroad if the United States prosecuted foreign diplo-
mats at home.208 Before limiting the scope of diplomatic immunity,
Congress must weight the seriousness of this potential harm.209
The logic behind the functional necessity theory holds that in the
absence of diplomatic immunity, the receiving state could conduct an
official campaign of harassment against the foreign envoy. This could
either disrupt relations or place political pressure on that foreign state
to change its stance on critical issues. 21° The receiving state could also
bring charges against foreign representatives in reprisal for actions
207. C. WILSON, supra note 21, at 32-38. For example, when the Long Island town
of Glen Cove rescinded recreational privileges for Soviet diplomats who lived there, the
Soviets took reciprocal action against the American mission by rescinding the em-
bassy's beach privileges on the river at Nikolnaya Gora. Griffin, supra note 185, at 21.
When British officials implicated and subsequently arrested Nigerian diplomats for
kidnapping a Nigerian exile and attempting to smuggle him out of Great Britain
through the diplomatic pouch, Nigeria retaliated by detaining a British Caledonian
flight out of Nigeria and holding three British citizens in detention. DIPLO.MATIC
CRIME, supra note 7, at 204-13.
In 1964, when District of Columbia police ticketed illegally parked diplomats, 87
Americans received moving violations outside the United States Embassy in Manila,
Philippines in one day. Turan, supra note 46, at 20.
A long history of reciprocity exists between the United States and Soviet Union:
reciprocity in the area of espionage. Gwertzman, U.S. Plans Anti-Soviet Measures if
American Reporter is Not Freed, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1986, at 1. Most recently, the
Soviet Union arrested American journalist Nicholas Daniloff following the arrest of
Gennadi F. Zakharov in New York on espionage charges. Id. Critics believe that the
Soviet arrest of Daniloff was in direct retaliation for the Zakharov arrest. Id. See also
Note, A Comparison and Analysis of Inmmunities Defenses Raised by Soviet Nationals
Indicted Under United States Espionage Laws, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 259, 287-88
(1980) (evaluating espionage and diplomatic immunity).
See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1544-45 (noting that reciprocity is
the reason why nations agree to diplomatic immunity).
208. Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at 11-13; Govern-
ment Workers at Home ... and Abroad, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1987, at A13. It is
estimated that 60% of the United States diplomatic corps would not serve abroad in
certain countries if diplomatic immunity did not protect them. Griffin, supra note 185,
at 20.
209. Id. But see Hearings on Diplomatic Crimes Legislation, supra note 36, at
103-04 (stating that only moderate international repercussions would result in the event
that S.1437 was passed). Under the Helms approach, the President still has the consti-
tutional power of pardon, which the President could tailor to individual cases involving
serious foreign policy implications. Id.
Aside from the reaction in international public opinion, technically, nothing prevents
a foreign state from fabricating charges against United States diplomats abroad. 133
CONG. REC. S13,804 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (testimony of Pamela Trescott, Esq.).
Recently, the Cuban government made "ridiculous" charges against American diplo-
matic officials. Id. The Cubans did so without any investigation by the United States
for prosecuting Cuban officials. Id.
210. A New Regime, supra note 39, at 668.
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brought against its representatives abroad.2"' Some critics fear that be-
cause of the interdependent nature of international relations, the
United States would risk reciprocal action if it were to unilaterally
limit or abolish diplomatic immunity. A multilateral approach would
avoid possible retaliation against the United States in response to its
unilaterally limiting diplomatic immunity. 212 The United Nations is the
proper forum in which to hear the case for reform of the current prac-
tice of diplomatic immunity.213 The likelihood, however, of the United
Nations taking steps toward reform of diplomatic immunity remains
unclear.214
If the international community refuses to come to terms with the
vexing problems associated with diplomatic immunity, the elected rep-
resentatives of the United States government must decide whether to
continue to tolerate abuses of the diplomatic privilege. The types of
abuses detailed throughout this Comment, which are excused because
of diplomatic immunity, are far removed from the original intentions of
the drafters of the Vienna Convention."' As a result, the true inten-
211. Id. at 668-69.
212. Caplan, Crash of Envoy's Car Focuses Attention on International Law, Legal
Times, May 4, 1987, at 21.
213. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 346-50. The authors suggest that the
United Nations reinforce the principle of diplomatic immunity for diplomatic needs,
and to refrain from using diplomatic immunity as a shield against criminal behavior,
allowing those who commit violent crimes to go unpunished. Id.
An amended Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, which would allow diplo-
matic immunity for acts committed within diplomats official capacity, could appear
with the following changes:
With regards to the diplomatic bag, article 27(3) could be amended as follows:
"The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or UNREASONABLY detained. The diplomatic
bag shall be subject to reasonable, nonintrusive methods of inspection." (emphasis
added).
With respect to the inviolability of the diplomat, article 29 could read:
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable with respect to acts per-
formed in the course of the diplomat's official duties. In investigating acts com-
mitted outside the scope of the duties of the diplomatic agent, the receiving state
shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent
any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.
The first sentence of article 31, "A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state," would be deleted.
214. See Insuring Against Abuse, supra note 38, at 1536-37 (emphasizing the pos-
sible difficulty in coordinating 113 countries to amend the Vienna Convention).
215. See United Nations Conference, supra note 47, at 48 (noting that the Confer-
ence concluded that limiting the traditional scope of immunity for diplomats was neces-
sary); see also Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, preamble
(stating that the purpose of diplomatic immunity is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure efficient performance of the diplomatic function). If an international consensus
cannot be reached on the problem of diplomatic crime, the costs and benefits of rela-
tions with states who, by their practices, eschew a fundamental disregard for the value
of human life must be weighed. DIPLOMATIC CRIME, supra note 7, at 348. The value of
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tions of the Vienna Convention are not attained and relations among
the nation states continue to deteriorate.
CONCLUSION
Diplomatic immunity, as the majority of the international commu-
nity interprets the principle, protects diplomats in an attempt to ensure
diplomatic relations. This protection essentially amounts to a license to
break the law. Diplomatic immunity protects violators from punish-
ment for failing to obey the law of the receiving state.2" The interna-
tional community must seriously rethink this policy which places not
only diplomats, but their families, staff, and personal servants above
the law.
The international community, through a forum such as the United
Nations, must reevaluate the ancient principle of diplomatic immunity.
The United Nations needs to establish new guiding principles that
could preserve the basic concept of diplomatic immunity while defining
reasonable limits as to who is entitled to immunity. The participants in
this international debate must consist not only of international legal
scholars and those who conduct diplomacy, but also the victims of dip-
lomatic crime.
2 17
In the interim, the diplomatic crimes legislation that is pending in
the United States Congress is a small step in attempting to confront
the abuses of the diplomatic privilege. This legislation, however, does
not address the fundamental problems inherent in the current applica-
tion of diplomatic immunity. The current interpretation of diplomatic
immunity requires fundamental change. No justification exists in inter-
national law, or in any other principle of law or principle of justice, for
murder, rape, robbery, and assault to go unpunished.
having diplomatic relations with states which allow their diplomatic representatives to
commit crimes with no hint of responsibility for their actions and no intention to com-
pensate the victims of diplomatic crime for injuries suffered is questionable. Id.
216. Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations, supra note 7, art. 41.
217. See Trooboff, Diplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1987, at C8 (argu-
ing for a focus on the victims of wrongful conduct at the hands of diplomats).
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